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Primatological and archeological evidence along with anthropological accounts of hunter-gatherer societies indicate
that lethal between-group violence may have been sufficiently frequent during our ancestral past to have shaped our
evolved behavioral repertoire. Two simulations explore the possibility that heroism (risking one’s life fighting for the
group) evolved as a specialized form of altruism in response to war.We show that war selects strongly for heroism but
only weakly for a domain-general altruistic propensity that promotes both heroism and other privately costly,
group-benefiting behaviors. A complementary analytical model shows that domain-specific heroism should evolve
more readily when groups are small and mortality in defeated groups is high, features that are plausibly characteristic
of our collective ancestral past.
“When two tribes of primeval man, living in the same
country, came into competition, the tribe including the
greater number of courageous, sympathetic and faithful
members . . . would without doubt succeed best and
conquer the others.”
—Darwin, The Descent of Man, chap. 5, p. 156.
When Homer asks at the outset of The Iliad“What god drove them to fight with such afury?” he was posing a question that
remains problematic three thousand years later: What
makes soldiers willing to fight at great personal risk for
their polis, their tribe, their ethnic group, or their
country? There is no doubt that soldiers often do fight
in this manner; the history of warfare is, in large part,
the history of ordinary men (and, in recent times,
women) who willingly confronted the risk of death
when fighting for their tribe, polis, country, or other
group. In the present paper we call this behavior
“heroism.” Heroism is well recognized as a potential
human behavior, but the existence of heroism is most
commonly treated as a background assumption in
examining the nature of war. In this paper we address
what we see as the central puzzle of heroism: How
could it have evolved?
Most studies that address heroic actions in warfare
have focused on “proximate” answers—emotional,
cognitive, or other mechanisms that prompt such
behavior in the here and now. Thus, for example,
loyalty to small groups of fighting comrades (Gat
1999; Shills and Janowitz 1948; Stern 1995) or,
perhaps, a regiment (Holmes 1985), the rage and fear
provoked by an attack, or threat of an attack, against
one’s own group (Horowitz 2001), and cognitive
errors such as overconfidence about the risks involved
in heroism (Johnson 2004; Johnson et al. 2006;
Wrangham 1999b) have all been argued to support
such behavior. By the same token, social psychologists
have identified many mechanisms likely to be impli-
cated in humans’ frequent xenophobic willingness to
engage in hostile action against other groups—most
famously, the ease with which we categorize others
into “ingroup” and “outgroup,” favoring the former
and, often, demonizing the latter (Ackerman et al.
2006; Rothbart and Lewis 1988; Rothbart and Taylor
1992; Tajfel and Turner 1979).
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But this level of explanation, while certainly com-
pelling, is only one level of explanation, the other being
the “ultimate” or “evolutionary” processes that selected
for such proximate mechanisms through very long
periods of time, and a complete explanation of behav-
ior should thus consider both causal processes. Here
we focus on the latter: How could emotional and cog-
nitive responses that support “heroism” in modern times
have been positively selected during humans’ ancestral
past? By definition, heroism involves a fitness cost to
the individual (via increased risk of death); hence we
might expect it to be selected against, eventually dis-
appearing from the human population. Yet heroism
certainly does happen with some frequency across a
wide variety of cultures and societies, suggesting that it
is a species typical trait. How could this have come to
be?
One standard answer is Hamilton’s (1964) famous
explanation of how altruism in general might have
evolved. Hamilton turned attention to the selective
fate of genes rather than of individuals per se, pointing
out how sacrificial action by one individual could
result in genes supporting that act spreading more
rapidly than had the individual acted selfishly—as
long as the beneficiaries of such action were appropri-
ately close relatives.1 Inclusive fitness has been invoked
by Alexander (1979), Masters (1983), Shaw and Wong
(1989), Thayer (2004), van der Dennen (1995) and
many others in attempts to understand the genetic
basis of humans’ propensity for warfare and, using our
term, to heroism.2 The general point is that, during
humans’ remote ancestral past, groups were most
probably comprised largely of quite close kin, making
a disposition toward sacrificial action on behalf of the
group an attribute that could evolve, despite adaptive
costs to the individual per se.
Importantly, this account explains heroism as a
product of the same ultimate, selective processes that
might produce any other altruistic behaviors. Sharing
meat from a hunt, for example, could be explained as
readily as fighting for one’s group in a battle with
other groups. The account nicely combines a plausible
reconstruction of family-based social organization in
our ancestral past with a foundational idea in modern
evolutionary biology. It is also consistent with the per-
vasiveness of kinship rhetoric—the “fatherland, “band
of brothers,” etc.—in modern warfare (Johnson 1987).
It is quite plausible that the particular form of altruism
that interests us, heroism in defense of one’s group,
evolved via the combined impact of multiple processes
that have been invoked for explaining altruism
in general—including kin altruism, reciprocity in
exchange relationships (Axelrod 1984; Trivers 1971),
and multilevel selection (most notably, Sober and
Wilson 1998).3
Here we develop the possibility that, even without
the impact of kin altruism and reciprocity, heroism
could have evolved as a “domain specific” form of
altruism in response to warfare in our ancestral past.
The idea that human cognitive architecture consists, in
substantial part, of functionally specific information
processing modules is widely accepted in evolutionary
psychology and in cognitive neuroscience more
broadly, although scholars differ in arguing for a
strong version of modularity (notably Cosmides and
Tooby 1994; Hirschfeld and Gelman 1994; Sperber
1994) or for a combination of specialized modules and
some more general functionality (notably Buller 2005;
Fodor 2000; Mithen 1996). The standard strong
modularity argument is given by Cosmides and Tooby
as follows:
. . . different adaptive problems require different solu-
tions . . . Speed, reliability, and efficiency can be engi-
neered into specialized mechanisms because there is no
need to engineer a compromise between competing task
demands . . . As a rule, when two adaptive problems have
solutions that are incompatible or simply different, a
single general solution will be inferior to two specialized
solutions. (1994, 89)
However this argument plays itself out (for a con-
structive appraisal see Barrett and Kurzban 2006), the
extensive literature on human altruism has, to our
knowledge, focused exclusively on the problem of how
a generalized disposition to altruistic behavior might
have evolved. The possibility that multiple, domain
specific altruistic dispositions might have evolved
independently, each in response to a distinctive adap-
tive problem and each producing, therefore, at least
somewhat different proximate mechanisms, appears
1Hamilton’s rule is that altruism can evolve under the condition
rb > c, that is when the benefit to the recipient (b) multiplied by the
relatedness of the recipient to the altruist (r) is greater than the cost
(c) to the altruist.
2The list includes Sir R. A. Fisher who, in his foundational work
The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection (1930, 163), addressed
the problem of “heroism” in tribal societies finding a solution in
terms that anticipated Hamilton’s relatedness-based theory of
altruism.
3Various authors have discussed the ways in which mechanisms
that have been presented as conceptually distinct might be sub-
sumed by one another. For example: Sober and Wilson (1998) see
kin selection as being subsumed by multilevel selection; Reeve
(2000) sees Sober and Wilson’s model as a special case of Hamil-
ton’s equations; and Humphrey (1997) sees kin selection and reci-
procity as generalizing into a single broad principle.
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to have been overlooked. Since heroism is, by our defi-
nition, an altruistic response on behalf of one’s group
in the event of war with some other group, its task
demands would appear prima facie quite distinct from
those of other altruistic behaviors (e.g., providing
food to others and caring for the sick). This makes it
plausible that heroism could have evolved on its own
trajectory, independent of other forms of altruism,
and with warfare as the agent of selection.4
Warfare is a group-level phenomenon, and its
broad outcomes (victory, defeat, and standoff) are also
group-level phenomena. Accordingly, all group
members—those who fight as well as those who do
not—can suffer “genetic death” should the group be
defeated. However, the consequences of group-level
outcomes can differ among the individuals compris-
ing such groups. Most important in the present
context, those who fight in the group’s wars run an
increased risk of dying, reducing the probability that
their genes will pass on to the next generation. Should
the group be victorious, survivors stand to benefit sig-
nificantly, but heroes are less likely to be among those
survivors. Along with males’ sexual access to females
from the defeated group (viz: rape, captured concu-
bines etc.), the spoils of victory can include access to
the defeated group’s territory and whatever resources
that territory contains. Clearly, frequent warfare
during humans’ ancestral past could have had major
adaptive consequences for individuals in the warring
groups.5 Since heroism as we have defined it is central
to the outcome of wars, the evolution of heroism is a
good candidate for being among those consequences.
How frequent was ancestral war? Attempts to
answer this question have provoked a good deal of
controversy. Some accounts of the archeological
record suggest that war during humans’ evolutionary
past was frequent and consequential. Keeley, for
example, observes that the estimate of 100 million
deaths from war-related causes in the twentieth
century is
. . . twenty times smaller than the losses that might have
resulted if the world’s population were still organized
into bands, tribes, and chiefdoms. A typical tribal society
lost about .5 percent of its population in combat each
year. Applying this casualty rate to the earth’s twentieth-
century populations predicts more than 2 billion war
deaths since 1900. (1997, 93; italics in the original)
In a book that covers much the same territory, LeBlanc
comments:
Just how common was warfare in the past? I have finally
concluded that warfare was quite common . . . and that
my findings on three continents and within multiple
time periods were not a fluke but the norm. This has led
me to reason that if conflict was common, then it must
have been an important occurrence in the course of
human history. (LeBlanc and Register 2003, xii–xiii;
italics in the original)
Other authors have developed the same general theme
(e.g., Bowles 2006; Carman and Harding 1999; Gat
1999; Gat 2006; Martin and Frayer 1997; Rice and
LeBlanc 2001), and Goodall’s (1986) discovery that
male chimpanzees sometimes engage in deadly raids
and ambushes against neighboring populations raises
the possibility that warfare among hominids may go
back at least to our common ancestor with chimpan-
zees. (See also Alexander 1979; Low 1993; Wilson and
Wrangham 2003; Wrangham 1999a; Wrangham and
Peterson 1996.)
Why was warfare such an important part of
humans’ ancestral life? The most plausible explana-
tion invokes humans’ achievement of ecological
dominance—their becoming the top predator, pre-
sumably associated with tool use—making the behav-
ior of other humans the main selective pressure on the
species. The argument, first developed by Alexander
(1989, 1990), is succinctly stated by Geary:
As our ancestors improved in their ability to secure
resources from the ecology, the primary problem became
staying in control of the best ecologies—that is, keeping
other humans from securing the same ecological
resources. (2005, 7)
4Although the group-level event warfare is the agent of selection,
we emphasize that the target of selection per se is the individual
behavior heroism and by extension whatever configuration of
genes might support the propensity to behave heroically. We
realize, of course, that the term “heroism” is commonly used more
broadly. Becker and Eagly (2004), for example, examine “heroism”
exhibited by Carnegie medalists, by non-Jews who risked their
lives to rescue Jews during the Holocaust, by kidney donors, and by
volunteers for the Peace Corps and Doctors of the World. Here we
restrict the term only to altruistic action in warfare.
5A growing literature has addressed multi-level selection on nor-
mative systems and institutions, some of it paying particular atten-
tion to warfare as the agent of selection. Soltis, Boyd and Richerson
(1995), for example, used the extensive ethnographic literature on
New Guinea to assess whether warfare and associated group
extinctions had been sufficiently frequent to account for the evo-
lution of group-benefiting normative and institutional patterns,
concluding that it had not; for such selective processes to have
significantly influenced even one such group attribute, between
500 and 1000 years would have been necessary. Other work assess-
ing the selective impact of warfare in multi-level terms includes
Dawson (1999) and Richerson and Boyd (1999); a foundational
work on multi-level selection in general is Sober and Wilson
(1998). For critical assessments of multi-level selection, see Reeve
(2000) and Maynard Smith (1998). In the model to be developed
here, groups can live or die as a consequence of warfare, but
individual attributes are what replicate, with the individual’s
behavior potentially being critical for the success and survival of
the group, thus for replication of his own attributes.
ancestral war and the evolutionary origins of “heroism” 929
While Geary and others (see also Flinn, Geary, and
Ward 2005) build from this assumption to develop the
thesis that humans’ cognitive capacities are in general
based on the peculiar demands of social and ecological
competition, our concern is more narrowly with the
consequences of between-group competition for
selection on whatever genes support the single behav-
ior heroism in war.
Some anthropologists do challenge the idea that
war was a persistent feature of our ancestral past. Fry,
for example, takes issue with Keeley and LeBlanc
whose books, in his view, are simply expressing
modern cultural beliefs about human nature being
“essentially violent and warmongering,” thus suggest-
ing that war is as a result “natural” among humans; he
emphasizes “the human potential for peace” as an
alternative perspective (2006, 2). Whether Fry is cor-
rectly characterizing the position taken about human
nature by these authors (and we think he is not), the
empirical issue is the incidence of warfare in the
ancestral past, not humans’ capacity for peaceful
cooperation—which we think is obvious, being well
developed across several disciplines—making Fry’s
and related arguments (e.g., Fuentes 2004; Sponsel
1996) beside the point. Nevertheless, few scholars
dispute that warfare—or, more broadly, “coalitional
violence”—has been present, at least to some extent,
throughout our ancestral past, and our question is
whether warfare, happening with any significant fre-
quency, could have selected for heroism. The simula-
tions that we will now describe (and the analytic
section to follow) allow us to study the relationship
between frequency of warfare and such selection, and
we will report findings to that effect later in the paper.
Two Simulations
In the first simulation, altruism is domain general,
promoting two behaviors: (1) communitarianism—a
privately costly but group-benefiting behavior that
increases the mean fitness of group members but does
not involve fighting external enemies; and (2)
heroism—a privately costly behavior that benefits the
group by contributing to the group’s success in
warfare. In the second simulation, these two behaviors
are promoted by two domain-specific attributes that
are free to evolve independently. A formal description
of the two simulations can be found in the online
appendix at http://journalofpolitics.org/articles.html;
here we provide a verbal account of the two simula-
tions’ key features.
Model 1: Domain General Altruism
Groups and resources. Four groups each occupy a
fixed resource base on which its members are criti-
cally dependent for nourishment, thus for survival
and reproduction. The size of the resource base for
each group is a parameter; it can vary across groups
but not across time and sets a limit on sustainable
group size.
Altruism. Each group member has a propensity to
behave altruistically, which is modeled as a continuous
variable with values between 0 (never) and 1 (always).
The starting mean altruism of each group is a param-
eter of the model; the altruistic propensity of a group’s
members varies in a uniform distribution centered at
the specified mean. An individual’s altruism increases
the reproductive success of all group members and
contributes to the group’s success in warfare, both as a
function of that individual’s altruism score (the more
altruistic, the more benefit to others across both
domains). The reproductive cost paid by the indi-
vidual is similarly a function of that score (the more
altruistic, the greater the cost to self).
Baseline Fertility and Individual Reproduction.
Baseline fertility is the probability of each group mem-
ber’s having an offspring in a given generation—prior
to any adjustments based on the incidence of altruism
in the group (the more altruism summed across all
group members, the greater each group member’s
probability of reproducing), the individual’s own
altruism score (the greater that score, the smaller the
probability of that individual’s reproducing), or the
outcome of war (group members who do not survive
wars do not reproduce). Should there be more than
one war in a generation, the cost of participating
(reduced probability of surviving, thus of reproduc-
ing) is assessed separately for each.
Going to War. A group goes to war when its popu-
lation exceeds the carrying capacity of the resource
base—that is, when the resource base per capita drops
below a specified threshold. At this point the only way
a group can support its members is to capture the
resources held by another group. Target groups are
chosen at random, with any group that is attacked by
another having to defend itself by fighting.
Victory and Defeat. The group with the highest
summed altruism score wins. This represents the total
amount of heroic fighting available within each group.
Consistent with the “imbalance of power” hypothesis
developed by biologists and primatologists (Alexander
1979; Wrangham 1999a)—as well as with Napoleon’s
comment that “God is on the side of large armies”—
the larger group will win when the mean propensity to
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altruism is equal across two contending groups.
However, a smaller population can defeat a larger one
if its members are substantially more altruistic (hence
more heroic).
Death. Some proportion of the defeated group is
killed. We will report our simulation findings from
the strong assumption that all are killed, so that
defeated groups are eliminated from the evolving
population. While this extreme assumption is cer-
tainly consistent with some examples from the his-
torical record (Potidaea, Mytilene, and Melos in the
Peloponnesian war, for example), the proportion of a
defeated group that is killed is an important param-
eter, to which we will return later in a later analytic
section (a full development is available on the Jour-
nal’s website). In the simulation, members of the vic-
torious group migrate to the newly captured territory
such that per-capita resources in the two areas are
equalized. Once migration is complete, no “memory”
of prior ties persists, so the two “daughter” groups
created by the schism are just as likely to attack one
another in subsequent rounds as they are to attack a
different group.
Variation. Selection on altruism—as on any other
attribute—can, of course, only happen in the context
of variation on that attribute. As noted, members of
each group vary in altruism at the start of the simula-
tion. During reproduction, variation is maintained by
two mechanisms. One models random mutation
(defined as M1 in the online appendix at http://
journalofpolitics.org/articles.html); by default, it
occurs here in less than 1% of offspring and can result
in the offspring having an altruism level quite different
from the parent. The other mechanism (defined as M2
in the online appendix) simulates (without directly
modeling) sexual reproduction, such that offspring
resemble their parent within a range of variability.
Model 2: Domain Specific with Both
“Communitarianism” and “Heroism”
The second simulation has the same general structure,
except that each individual now has two domain spe-
cific altruistic propensities, heroism and communi-
tarianism, each similarly modeled as varying between
0 and 1. Starting mean heroism and communitarian-
ism for each group are separate parameters of the
model. Member levels for the two attributes are inde-
pendently drawn from a uniform distribution cen-
tered at the specified mean. Reproductive costs from
communitarianism are paid every generation; those
from heroism are paid per war.
An Aside on Simplicity
versus Realism
Model building necessarily involves reducing the
known complexity of the natural world in the interests
of simplicity, tractability, and interpretable results.
The two models described make a number of simpli-
fying assumptions. Most notably, perhaps, we have not
incorporated males’ efforts to capture female repro-
ductive capacities as a basis for warfare. As Trivers
(1972) classically pointed out, female reproductive
capacities are, for males, a critical but scarce resource,
one that can be seen as a root cause of male-on-male
fighting. Chagnon’s (1988) well-known field work
among the Yanomamö, for example, supports that
position, and the point has been developed recently in
the case of civil war by Kanazawa (2006). At the very
least, there must have been a complex relationship
between capturing somatic resources and capturing
females in motivating our (male) ancestors to go to
war. Indeed, how such complexity was worked out by
the early Israelites is suggested by Betzig (2005, 335) in
her analysis of the Biblical case:
God handed Moses two different laws about spoils. One
was for wars with close neighbors; the other was for
more remote wars. When their enemies lived far away,
he said, ‘you shall put all the males to the sword, but the
women and the little ones, the cattle, and everything
else in the city, all its spoil, you shall take as booty for
yourselves.’ But when their enemies lived nearby, ‘you
shall save alive nothing that breathes, but you shall
utterly destroy them.’ Land was the limiting factor.
(Deuteronomy 20, 13–17)
In the same vein, neither of our models explicitly
differentiates between males and females. Although
our algorithm for reproduction simulates the variabil-
ity that sexual reproduction entails, offspring have a
single parent, and given the strongly sex-typed role of
war fighting, that single parent is most reasonably
interpreted as male. While we wish to emphasize that
our interest is in heroism—risking one’s life on behalf
of the group during warfare—and not in aggressive-
ness per se, it is certainly true that, historically, heroism
has been an overwhelmingly male activity, one closely
associated with males’ relatively greater propensity to
violence (Daly and Wilson 1988). The greater partici-
pation of women in war in recent times certainly indi-
cates that women, like men, are quite capable of
heroism in warfare, but the available archaeological
and anthropological evidence provides much less
support for supposing that participation in warfare
provided strong selection on women’s heroism as we
model that attribute here.
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Many other considerations of interest in the study
of war are also missing here. When population growth
begins to pressure the carrying capacity of a group’s
resource base, the model incorporates no internal con-
flict over the increasingly scarce resources (Diamond
2005), and populations do not have the option of
migrating to a different, unoccupied, resource base.
When one side wins a war, casualties among the vic-
torious group are modeled only indirectly, via the
reproductive costs suffered in proportion to an agent’s
heroism. In the simulations—although not, as we will
show, in our analytic development—the losing group
is completely wiped out.6 Groups do not have the
option of coalescing with other groups to improve
their odds of winning a war or the option of rationally
calculating which other group they will attack with an
eye to maximizing the probability of victory. Nor does
our model incorporate the “security dilemma” that
Gat (2000a, 2000b, 2006) has so importantly devel-
oped in prisoner’s dilemma terms as a reason for pre-
emptive fighting. And so on.
In general, however, for this preliminary analysis
little is to be gained by developing these complexities.
The virtue of focusing on a single causal chain is that
if selection on a particular attribute is demonstrated
the antecedent of that attribute is clear; but results
become increasingly difficult to interpret as further
processes are incorporated. The most obvious
example is the model’s assumption that somatic
resources were the critical “limiting factor” underlying
our ancestors’ going to war with each other. This
assumption is consistent with the work of many
anthropologists, biologists, ethologists, political scien-
tists, psychologists, sociologists, and others addressing
the causes of ancient warfare (e.g., Alcock 1978;
Carneiro 1970; Durham 1976; Eibl-Eibesfeldt 1979;
Kennett and Kennett 2000, 2006; Kennett et al. 2006;
Lambert 1997; Lambert and Walker 1991; Shaw and
Wong 1989; Thayer 2004; van den Berghe 1978;
Wilson and Wrangham 2003). Nevertheless, we
acknowledge, with Gat (2006), that somatic resources
and males’ sexual access to females are both critical,
adaptively relevant scarce resources, thus that compe-
tition over both must have been at the root of ancient
warfare. Our models are designed to discover whether
heroic propensities could plausibly have been selected
for by war even without this additional factor in play.
Method
We ran 10,000 simulations of each of the two models.
To ensure that the data we report reflect a wide variety
of possible evolutionary environments, the following
parameters were drawn randomly7 for each run:
1. Each group’s resource endowment (Rg)—specified
separately for each group;
2. Baseline fitness—the probability of reproductive
success for all agents before the consequences of
altruism, communitarianism, heroism or warfare
are incorporated (Pb);
3. The fitness advantage to the group’s members from
an individual’s communitarianism (Pc);
4. The cost to the individual agent of its own commu-
nitarianism (CC);
5. The cost to the individual agent of its heroism (RH);
6. (In Model 1) Mean starting altruism (SA);
7. (In Model 2) Mean starting communitarianism
and heroism (SC, SH);
8. The two sources of variation (two types of muta-
tion) in the attributes of offspring as specified in
the appendix (M1, M2).
Two parameters were fixed across all the simulations:
the survival threshold, T = 1 (one unit of resource per
capita), and the number of groups (four).
Each of the 10,000 simulations was run for 1,100
generations, allowing a sufficient number of genera-
tions for the system to evolve away from diverse start-
ing values. For the last 100 generations we recorded
the moving average of altruism in the domain general
model, and of communitarianism and heroism in the
domain specific model. The simulation parameters
(which varied across runs as described above) and the
frequency of wars across all generations (an emergent
variable) were also recorded for each simulation. In a
smaller sample of runs to check for the system’s sen-
sitivity to some of our choices, we increased the
number of generations and varied both the number of
groups and the length of the moving average across
which we recorded data. None of these modifications
affected our results.
6This simplification was necessary to prevent the population
growing out of control, which both expanded groups beyond plau-
sible sizes for ancestral groups and also increased computational
demands exponentially.
7From a multivariate uniform distribution with an identity corre-
lation matrix with Rg ~ U[50,100], Pb ~ U[0,0.5], PC ~ U[0,0.5],
cC ~ U[0,0.1], cH ~ U[0,0.1], SA ~ U[0,1] (SC, SH for the two
attribute model), M1 ~ U[0,0.005], M2 ~ U[0,0.05]. Notations
specified here are employed in the formal statement on http://
journalofpolitics.org/articles.html.
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Findings
With the domain general model we observed a modest
but significant selection on altruism. This is shown in
Figure 1, which is a frequency distribution for evolved
altruism. The horizontal axis specifies the altruism
level averaged across the last 100 generations of the
10,000 simulations, and the vertical axis records the
density of cases across the randomized parameter
space. The mean altruism value in this positively
skewed distribution is .25 (the median is .17), inter-
pretable as the mean individual being 25% altruistic—
or, alternatively, that the mean individual would have a
.25 probability of contributing to group members’
fitness via its communitarian activities and a .25 prob-
ability of fighting heroically in any war.
Despite the fact that both behavioral conse-
quences of general purpose altruism are reproduc-
tively costly to individuals, therefore, we do observe
some positive selection on that attribute. Agents pay a
reproductive cost proportional to the strength of their
generalized disposition to altruism, but this cost is
outweighed by the benefits that individuals reap from
their group’s success in warfare. Multiple regression of
ending altruism values on parameters in the model
(see Appendix B on online appendix at http://
journalofpolitics.org/articles.html) shows a negative
association between evolved altruism and (1) the cost
of altruism; (2) the average size of group resource
bases (hence, the average size of groups); and (3)
variation in resource base size (hence, variation in size
among the groups); it also shows a positive association
between altruism and the frequency of war. This sug-
gests that higher (and less typical) evolved values of
altruism occurred in simulation runs where the per-
sonal cost of altruism was low, where groups were
smaller and more equal in size, and where wars were
quite frequent.
With the domain specific model, in which com-
munitarianism and heroism were free to evolve as
separate attributes, Figures 2a and 2b show that: (1)
heroism evolved to substantially higher levels than
communitarianism with means of 66.9% and 30.5%,
respectively, and medians of 70.3 and 22.6, respec-
tively; (2) both attributes evolved to significantly
higher levels than did altruism in the domain general
model. There are, therefore, three findings to be
explained—first, the fact that there was some positive
selection on general purpose altruism; second, that
FIGURE 1 Frequency distribution of evolved
altruism in the one-attribute model.
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FIGURE 2a Frequency distribution of evolved
heroism in the two-attribute model.
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there was stronger selection on heroism than on com-
munitarianism; and third, that when communitarian-
ism and heroism are free to evolve separately, both
evolve to higher levels than when they are combined as
expressions of a single, general purpose altruism. We
will address the evolution of general purpose altruism
shortly; first we discuss the relative evolution of the
two domain specific forms.
Why Does Heroism Evolve to Higher Levels
than Communitarianism?
In our model heroism is only costly in the event of war.
Given that war only occurs periodically—in the simu-
lations any given group goes to war with a probability of
about .5 per generation—while communitarianism
occurs in every generation, perhaps heroism evolves to
a higher level simply because the cost of heroism is paid
less frequently than the cost of communitarianism.
This does appear to be part of the story. Figure 3
reports the distribution of heroism when its cost is
paid every generation rather than per war. With the
mean of this distribution now at .475 (as opposed to
.669 in the original domain specific model), clearly
this cost difference accounts for some of the relatively
greater selection on heroism. Across the range of
parameters, it appears that selection on heroism is
stronger when such behavior is not invoked every gen-
eration, as is communitarianism. But that is only part
of the story, since the mean of heroism is still substan-
tially higher when it is evoked every generation than is
the mean of communitarianism (.305) when it, too, is
evoked every generation.
Another part of the story concerns the immediacy
of the military benefits a group reaps from communi-
tarianism and heroism. Since reproduction happens at
the end of each generation, communitarianism
increases the number of fighters a group will be able to
field in the next generation while heroism increases a
group’s fighting capacity in the present one. Thus
communitarianism can only increase a group’s future
fighting ability—assuming the group survives any
wars in the current generation, which will depend on
group size and heroism now. The delayed effect of
communitarianism is, of course, consistent with real-
life population dynamics. Since infants and young
children confer no advantage in war, the war-fighting
benefits of increased fertility cannot be realized
immediately.
Communitarianism is also a “double-edged
sword” for a group. While larger groups are more likely
to win wars, high population growth can also be
responsible for getting a group into war in the first
place (faster population growth, produced by commu-
nitarianism, means that a group reaches its carrying
capacity more rapidly). War always entails some
chance of defeat, thus of selection against communi-
tarianism. Heroism, on the other hand, is an unam-
biguous good. In the absence of war, it does no harm
to the individual or the group, but in the event of war
it can be decisive for victory.
Ultimately, selection on communitarianism and
on heroism must be a function of whether the behav-
ior produced by those dispositions is “critical” to the
group’s success in warfare—thus to the individual’s
own survival and reproduction—and while both
contributions might be critical for the outcome of a
given war, heroism is more likely to be critical than
communitarianism.
Why, Then, Does Altruism Evolve?
The positive selection on general purpose altruism in
the single attribute model, modest as it is, can now be
explained in the same way as selection on heroism and
communitarianism in the two attribute model. Altru-
ists fight for their groups, and a given altruist’s fighting
can be critical for the group’s survival, thus for the
altruist’s own survival. Similarly—although with a
lower probability—an altruist’s communitarian
behaviors might also be critical for such survival via
the role that numbers as such can play in the outcome
of wars.
FIGURE 3 Frequency distribution of evolved
heroism when the cost of heroism is
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Why Do Communitarianism and Heroism
Evolve Further than General Purpose
Altruism?
When heroism and communitarianism are free to
evolve independently, both evolve to higher levels than
the single, general purpose altruism.8 Why is this?
The most straightforward explanation has to do
with the more favorable cost-benefit ratio for the spe-
cialized behaviors. When a single, general purpose
mechanism performs two distinct functions (A and B)
both of which decrease individual fitness, selection
against that mechanism based on the costs of A will
also select against B, and vice versa. The general
purpose capacity will, in other words, pay a cost when-
ever either of the two behaviors is invoked. Conversely,
when distinct, special purpose mechanisms are dedi-
cated to A and to B, selection based on the individual
costs of B has no implications for selection based on
the costs of A, and vice versa. Thus, breaking the
general purpose mechanism down into two special
purpose mechanisms means that the evolution of one
attribute is not handicapped by the cost of the other.
Notice that heroism, invoked only every second gen-
eration or so, benefits more from such “de-linking of
costs” than communitarianism.
This finding points to the cost-benefit logic that
could support a modular design for the evolved “cog-
nitive architecture of altruism.” The degree to which
propensities for different forms of altruistic behavior
are, in modern humans, actually correlated (positively
or negatively) is, of course, an empirical question
awaiting investigation by other means than computa-
tional modeling. Also, findings from the model do not
resolve the general problem of how privately costly
altruistic dispositions (whether unitary or multiple)
actually did evolve—a problem that is, of course, much
discussed (notably, in recent years, by reference to
“altruistic punishment”; see, e.g., Fehr and Gachter
2002; Fehr and Henrich 2003). Each disposition must
still be positively selected despite the costs that it gen-
erates for the acting individual. Nevertheless, the
finding does raise the possibility that thinking about
altruism as a bundle of special purpose forms of altru-
istic behaviors—each evoked in some circumstances
but not in others—and not as a single general purpose
disposition evoked regardless of the contextual specif-
ics, will prove a fruitful path to follow. Whatever they
might be, selective pressures favoring special purpose
altruisms (plural) would not have to be as strong,ceteris
paribus, to overcome the associated costs as would
selective pressures favoring general purpose altruism
(singular) for the behavior in question to evolve.
The case for humans’ past being one of “constant
battles” becomes increasingly difficult to make the
further back in time one looks and, as discussed above,
this has fueled arguments about just how “constant”
warfare actually was in our ancestral past. Those
arguments—and related arguments about the lethality
of such warfare—remain for archeologists to resolve.
However, as shown online in Appendix B, in our simu-
lation the frequency of warfare does positively predict
selection on altruism in the first model, and selection
on both communitarianism and heroism in the
second one.9
One strong assumption of both simulations is that
all members of defeated groups are killed. To examine
what happens when this is relaxed, we turned to an
analytic model.
An Analytic Model of Heroism
Although, as discussed, our simulations make a range
of simplifying assumptions, they are still more
complex than what can be readily modeled analyti-
cally. Accordingly, we employed a simplified analytic
model to explore more rigorously the impact of a few
key parameters on the evolution of heroism.10 The cost
of this precision was to reduce the number of groups
from four to two equally sized groups and to model
heroism as a dichotomous variable with each agent
being either fully heroic or a complete coward.
(Appendix C on the Journal’s website contains a
formal description of the model.)
As noted above, the simulation results are based
on the strong assumption that a defeated group is
entirely wiped out. Although the archeological record
does suggest that genocide was at least sometimes
8Mean evolved communitarianism and heroism values have a zero
correlation. Hence there was no tendency for something akin to
generalized altruism to evolve in the second, domain specific
model; nor was there evidence for agents to “specialize” in a par-
ticular form of domain-specific altruism.
9Other key input parameters such as the cost of heroism, the size of
groups’ resource bases, and variation in the size of groups’
resource bases were all significant negative predictors of heroism.
10In our simulation, genocide in the event of defeat is the only way
that agents die. Reducing the level of genocide in the simulation
produced exponential population growth and constant war—
along with a vastly increased demand on computational resources.
With G = 1, however, population size remains more or less con-
stant, cycling around the same mean. Accordingly, for the analysis
of genocide and population size, we have relied exclusively on the
analytic results.
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practiced in the ancestral past (Keeley 1997; LeBlanc
and Register 2003) and the elimination of a competing
group has been documented in a chimpanzee popula-
tion (Wilson and Wrangham 2003), we simply do not
know just how pervasive this actual outcome was.
What happens when the simulation’s genocide
assumption is relaxed?
In the analytic model, any individual’s probability
of surviving a war is defined by 1 – dG, when d is the
probability of the group’s being defeated (a function
of the relative summed heroism scores in the two con-
tending groups) and G is the proportion of the
defeated group that is killed (the genocide parameter).
At one extreme, therefore, if the genocide parameter
were 1.0 and the entire defeated group is to be killed,
then an individual hero’s actions would be critical if
the two warring groups were otherwise equal in
their summed heroism scores—critical for the group’s
survival, and hence also for the survival of the hero
(and thus his chances for reproductive success). At the
other extreme with the genocide parameter at zero, all
individuals survive the war despite their defeat,
meaning that a hero’s action, while costing him per-
sonally, does nothing to promote the relative survival
of his group (including his offspring) compared to the
competing group. It follows, therefore, that as G
increases, the probability of an individual’s heroism
rebounding to his own advantage also increases.
Figure 4 shows the proportion of heroes q* as a func-
tion of the G parameter across three different popula-
tion sizes11 when, in equilibrium, it is equally
beneficial to be a hero or a coward. (See Proposition 3
and related proof in the online Appendix C at http://
journalofpolitics.org/articles.html.) As population
size increases from 50 through 100 to 200, the slopes of
the curves flatten out and the equilibrium proportion
of heroes for a given level of the genocide parameter is
reduced.
In summary, selection on heroism in the context
of warfare is governed by two parameters, genocide
and group size: (1) The larger the proportion of the
defeated group that is killed, the more critical a hero’s
action likely will be for his own survival and repro-
duction, thus for selection on heroism; (2) The smaller
the group, the more likely it is that any given individu-
al’s heroic action will be critical to the group’s sur-
vival, thus again for his own survival and reproductive
success, hence for selection on heroism.
Summary and Conclusions
Using simulation, we have demonstrated that
heroism—a willingness to fight for one’s group even
when it places oneself at a reproductive disadvantage
relative to other group members—can evolve based on
the selective pressures of war within a population of
groups that, at least sometimes, go to war with each
other over scarce resources needed for individual and
group survival. In the first simulation agents are char-
acterized by a general purpose altruism (supporting
both “communitarianism” and “heroism”), and there
is modest positive selection on that attribute. When
agents are characterized by the two independent,
special purpose attributes heroism and communitar-
ian, however, both of those attributes evolve to higher
levels than general purpose altruism, with heroism
evolving to substantially higher levels than communi-
tarianism. All three attributes evolve insofar as the
individual’s action, while personally costly, can
increase the possibility of the group surviving a war,
therefore of the individual’s also surviving—thus of
reproducing.
We have also shown that heroism is particularly
likely to evolve when group size is small and when the
casualty rate for defeated groups is high. The ecologi-
cal validity of the first of these parameters is, of course,
compatible with the accepted fact that our remote
ancestors did live in quite small groups (Dunbar 1993;
11In the analytical model with the total population consisting of
two groups, the curves in Figure 4 correspond to group sizes of 25,
50, and 100. In the simulation runs reported above (in which
G = 1), the average resource base size (which constrains group
size) was 75 (and ranged from 50 to 100), with mean evolved
values of heroism of .475 and .669, depending, respectively, on
whether the cost of heroism was paid per generation or per war.
FIGURE 4 Equilibrium proportion of heroes q*
across two groups as a function of
genocide G for three different
population sizes n, Pb = .5, c = .05
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Dunbar 1996), but the second is more problematic.
On the one hand, had we modeled the capture of
reproductively valuable females, this would reduce the
death rates of defeated groups, increase the growth
rate of the victorious group, and allow direct gene flow
between defeated and winning groups. On the other,
the probability of most or all members of a defeated
group being wiped out would, surely, have been higher
in small groups than in larger ones.
This said, the analytic model does demonstrate
that complete genocide is not necessary for heroism to
evolve. It can still do so—albeit, to lower (and we
expect, more realistic) levels—with substantially less
draconian outcomes to warfare.
Our findings with respect to the possible impact
of war on heroism are not incompatible with
heroism also evolving in response to Hamiltonian
(1964) inclusive fitness. Heroism certainly could have
evolved among (small) kinship groups in which
members fought in response to threats to their kin,
and it’s also likely that the sense of group identity—
whether among small units of soldiers or among the
millions of those who comprise a modern nation—
has its roots in ancient kinship responses. But our
results suggest that heroism could also have evolved
as a consequence of ancient warfare even absent close
kinship among groups’ members. In fact, attention to
the proximate mechanisms we sketched at the outset
suggests a complex interaction among the respective
mechanisms. On the one hand, if kinship in ancestral
times was the sole evolutionary basis for heroism, we
would expect modern humans to be less easily per-
suaded by mere kinship rhetoric to risk their lives for
nonkin in large-scale modern wars than they are
(Johnson 1987). On the other, if the processes we
have identified were all that mattered, we would
expect such kinship rhetoric to be irrelevant—which
it is not. Clearly, further research is needed on the
relative contribution of these two selective forces, and
the way in which they might interact in natural cir-
cumstances.
Does our model “take the heroism out of heroism”
(cf. Trivers 1971)? At the ultimate level at which we are
working, it does. This can be seen by considering the
extreme case where group size is reduced to one (the
acting individual) and the genocide parameter is set at
1. Here the individual is unambiguously fighting solely
for his own life. While increasing group size beyond
that minimum does produce other beneficiaries from
the individual’s fighting, selection still happens on
heroism only to the extent that an individual’s
heroism is critical for his own survival—and thus can
offset the reproductive costs the hero must pay relative
to other group members who benefit from his action
without having to pay such costs.
But, no doubt, most heroes are responding to par-
ticular emotions and cognitive processes, not running
such “private fitness accounting equations” in their
heads. Hector in front of Troy, for example, could have
been motivated by knowing that only he had any
chance of defeating Achilles and, therefore, of saving
his own life. But there is nothing of that in The Iliad.
On the contrary, the story makes it clear that he was
responding not only to fear for his own life—which he
clearly does experience—but to his love of Troy,
loyalty to his comrades, honor, and, perhaps in the
end, to overconfidence that led him to think he did
have a chance of defeating Achilles. It is his response to
those proximate emotions and beliefs that justifies his
status as a hero, not the evolutionary logic that, over
thousands of previous generations, led him to experi-
ence and act on those things in his particular, unfor-
tunate circumstances.
Our finding that communitarianism and heroism,
when modeled as separate, domain specific attributes,
both evolve to higher levels than domain general altru-
ism has, we believe, implications for research address-
ing the evolutionary roots of altruistic behavior in
general. It does not mean that the standard problem of
“compensating” altruism for the private costs indi-
viduals incur in performing altruistic acts is resolved.
Models of how domain-specific, special purpose altru-
istic dispositions might evolve must still respond to
that problem—as, indeed, our model has for heroism
and communitarianism. Nevertheless, to the extent
that altruisms (plural) will evolve to higher levels
when their costs are decoupled, we would expect
natural selection to favor such decouplings, thus a
quite complex, modular, structure of altruisms
(plural) within human’s cognitive and emotional
architecture, each responsive to perhaps quite special-
ized circumstances.
How far such decoupling might proceed would
depend, of course, on the particular design efficiencies
to be gained by decoupling, and we might expect at
least some limits in this respect as well as complemen-
taries at the proximate level (and, presumably, also at
the neural level). In general, however, our findings
suggest that empirical research might profitably turn
attention toward identifying how different forms
of altruism evolve differently across different
domains—a move that, once again, will surely be more
successful if conducted with an explicit sensitivity to
both ultimate and proximate causation.
If the propensity for heroism in warfare is, indeed,
a species typical attribute of humans, as our findings
ancestral war and the evolutionary origins of “heroism” 937
suggest is possible, does that condemn us to a future of
“constant battles”? Our model does not address that
question. In that model, war is triggered by resource
stress, but that is an assumption (plausible, we believe,
in light of the archeological studies cited earlier), not a
finding. An answer to the question, then, depends on
the particular proximate emotions and cognitive pro-
cesses that provoke heroic action in the here and now,
and whether those could, in themselves, also provoke
warfare—not only among our ancestors, but also
among ourselves and our descendants.
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